SUMMONS ISSUED BY CERTIFIED MAIL BY Certified Mail MENARD, INC. August 28, 2024 (2024)

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ABIGAIL REICHNER VS ZACHARY G LAUGHLIN

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BRANDON GORDON VS ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY

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NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE LLC D/B/A MR. COOPER VS TIMOTHY J FALOR

Aug 26, 2024 |CHRISTINE CROCE |FORECLOSURE |FORECLOSURE |CV-2024-08-3688

Ruling

KHATCHATUR BERBERIAN VS WALT DISNEY PICTURES, ET AL.

Aug 28, 2024 |23STCV22374

Case Number: 23STCV22374 Hearing Date: August 28, 2024 Dept: 31 Tentative Ruling Judge Kerry Bensinger, Department 31 HEARING DATE: August 28, 2024 TRIAL DATE: Not set CASE: Khatchatur Berberian v. Walt Disney Pictures, et al. CASE NO.: 23STCV22374 DEMURRERS WITHOUT MOTIONS TO STRIKE MOVING PARTY: Defendants Walt Disney Pictures, et al. RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Khatchatur Berberian I. BACKGROUND This is a Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) action. On September 15, 2023, Plaintiff, Khatchatur Berberian, filed a Complaint against Defendants Walt Disney Pictures, The Walt Disney Company, Disney Worldwide Services, Inc., Chester Carr (Carr), Sara Frederick, (Frederick), and Scott Mohler (Mohler). On November 7, 2023, Plaintiff filed the First Amended Complaint (FAC). On February 1, 2024, the court sustained Individual Defendants demurrer to the FAC. On March 29, 2024, the court sustained Walt Disney Pictures, The Walt Disney Company, Disney Worldwide Services, Inc.s (hereafter, Disney Defendants) demurrer to the FAC. On April 22, 2024, Plaintiff timely filed the Second Amended Complaint (SAC), alleging causes of action for: 1. Discrimination in Violation of the FEHA 2. Hostile Work Environment Harassment in Violation of the FEHA 3. Retaliation in Violation of the FEHA 4. Failure to Provide Reasonable Accommodation in Violation of the FEHA 5. Failure to Engage in the Interactive Process in Violation of FEHA 6. Failure to Prevent Discrimination, Harassment, or Retaliation in Violation of FEHA 7. Breach of Express Oral Contract Not to Terminate Employment Without Good Cause 8. Breach of Implied-in-Fact Contract Not to Terminate Employment Without Good Cause 9. Negligent Hiring, Supervision, and Retention 10. Whistleblower Retaliation (Labor Code § 1102.5) 11. Wrongful Termination of Employment in Violation of Public Policy 12. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. The only causes of action asserted against Carr, Frederick, and Mohler (hereafter, Individual Defendants) are the second and twelfth causes of action. Before the court are two demurrers to the SAC: (1) Individuals Defendants demurrer to the second and twelfth causes of action; and (2) Disney Defendants demurrer to the fourth, fifth, seventh, eighth, tenth, and twelfth causes of action. The demurrers are briefed. The court rules as follows. II. LEGAL STANDARD A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action.¿ (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.)¿ When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context, accepting the alleged facts as true.¿ (Nolte v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1406.)¿ Because a demurrer challenges defects on the face of the complaint, it can only refer to matters outside the pleading that are subject to judicial notice.¿ (Arce ex rel. Arce v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 471, 556.)¿ III. JUDICIAL NOTICE Individual Defendants and Disney Defendants submit identical requests for judicial notice of the following documents: · Verified Charge of Discrimination filed by Plaintiff with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH) on November 18, 2016, Charge No. 480-2016-03070. (Request for Judicial Notice (RJN) 1.) · DFEH Notice to Complainant and Respondent and Notice to Complainant of Right to Sue dated November 18, 2016, Charge No. 480-2016-03070. (RJN 2.) · EEOCs Dismissal and Notice of Rights, dated December 1, 2016, Charge No. 480-2016-03070. (RJN 3.) · Complaint of Employment Discrimination filed on behalf of Plaintiff with the DFEH on September 19, 2022, Case No. 202209-18285620. (RJN 4.) · DFEH Notice of Case Closure and Right to Sue letter dated September 19, 2023, Case No. 202209-18285620. (RJN 5.) The court previously granted these requests in connection with the rulings on the demurrers to the FAC. (See Minute Orders, 2/1/24 and 3/29/24.) IV. DISCUSSION A. Individual Defendants Demurrer The court begins by addressing Individual Defendants demurrer. Because SAC alleges different conduct on the part of each individual defendant, the court considers the allegations as to each individual defendant. 1. Hostile Work Environment Harassment in Violation of FEHA (2nd Cause of Action) Government Code section 12940, subdivisions (a) and (j)(1) provide the basis for FEHA claims for discrimination and harassment: race, religious creed, color, national origin, ancestry, physical disability, mental disability, medical condition, genetic information, marital status, sex, gender, gender identity, gender expression, age, sexual orientation, or veteran or military status . . . A hostile work environment is a recognized form of harassment. To establish a hostile work environment, harassment must be so severe or pervasive as to alter the conditions of the victims employment and create an abusive working environment based on the protected characteristic. (See Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1043.) Harassment must be of a repeated, routine, or generalized nature when the harassing conduct is not severe. (See Lyle v. Warner Bros. Television Productions (2006) 38 Cal.4th 264, 283.) Harassment that is occasional, isolated or sporadic is insufficient. (See id.) Whether an environment is hostile or abusive can be determined only by looking at all the circ*mstances. [Citation.] These may include the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employees work performance. The effect on the employees psychological well being is, of course, relevant to determining whether the plaintiff actually found the environment abusive. But while psychological harm, like any other factor, may be taken into account, no single factor is required. (Jones v. Dept of Corr. & Rehab. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1378 [cleaned up].) Frederick Frederick was Plaintiff and Carrs manager. (See SAC, ¶ 15(c).) Like the FAC, the SAC makes two allegations against Frederick: (1) that in or around February of 2014, Plaintiff complained to Frederick about a physical altercation with Carr and Frederick did nothing to address Carrs conduct (see SAC, ¶ 15(b)-(c)); and (2) that in or around 2018, Plaintiff complained to Frederick about Carrs treatment of Plaintiff and Plaintiffs suspicion that Carr was stealing. In response, Frederick dismissed Plaintiffs concerns, accused Plaintiff of threatening Carr, and a week later attempted to enforce[1] a write-up against Plaintiff for insubordination (SAC, ¶ 15(i)). These same allegations appeared in the FAC. The court sustained the demurrer. The court found previously that these allegations were insufficient to state a hostile work environment claim against Frederick because there was a lack of nexus between Frederick[s] 2014 and 2018 conduct and a protected characteristic. (Minute Order, 2/1/24.) The court further observed that Plaintiffs allegations failed to describe conduct by Frederick that is severe or pervasive, or repeated, routine, or generalized in nature. (Id.) The same defects still plague the SAC. There are no new allegations establishing that Fredericks conduct was severe, pervasive, or routine, let alone any allegations connecting that conduct to Plaintiffs protected characteristic. Plaintiffs opposition is difficult to parse. Plaintiff binds together all the alleged conductFrederick and Carrto argue the allegations are sufficient to state a claim against all defendants. Embedded in the opposition is the argument that the allegations are sufficiently pervasive to state a hostile work environment because (1) Frederick refusal to accommodate his requests not to work with Carr, and (2) Fredericks attempt to write-up Plaintiff for complaining about Carrs conduct. (See Opp., pp. 14:14-15:8.) There are three problems with this argument. First and foremost, Plaintiff does not allege that Frederick, specifically, denied Plaintiffs accommodation request. (See SAC, ¶¶ 15(e), 16.) Second, there are no allegations connecting the denial of the accommodations request to Plaintiffs protected characteristic. Third, the refusal of Plaintiffs accommodation request is alleged only in support of the fourth cause of action for failure to provide reasonable accommodation and the fifth cause of action for failure to engage in an interactive process. (See SAC, ¶¶ 46, 54.) The allegation is not alleged in support of the second cause of action. (See SAC, ¶¶ 29-36.)[2] Fredericks demurrer to the second cause of action is SUSTAINED. Because Plaintiff has not alleged any new facts to cure this defect, leave to amend is DENIED. Given the courts ruling, the court need not and does not address Fredericks argument that the second cause of action is time-barred. Carr Carr was a supervisor. (See SAC, ¶ 15(b).) Like the FAC, the SAC makes the following allegations against Carr: (1) in or around February of 2014, Plaintiff and Carr had a physical altercation wherein Carr shoved Plaintiff against the wall and put his hands around Plaintiffs head and blocked him from leaving the area (SAC, ¶ 15(b)); (2) on several occasions, Carr accused Plaintiff of not doing his job correctly, such as not picking up packages and misplacing packages, when Plaintiff was clearly not doing so (SAC, ¶ 15(f)); at least twice in early 2020, Carr went out of his way to be in Plaintiffs space and stared at Plaintiff and gave him dirty looks (Id.); Carr visited Plaintiff at Plaintiffs work area without warning and in violation of Plaintiffs accommodation (Id.); at least twice in 2020, Carr followed Plaintiff in an intimidating manner while Plaintiff completed his job duties (Id.); and, that Carrs conduct caused Plaintiff to feel as though Carr was targeting him due to his complaints about Carr and his requests not to work with Carr (Id.). These same allegations appeared in the FAC. The court found these allegations were insufficient to state a hostile work environment claim against Carr because there were no factual allegations connecting Carrs conduct and Plaintiffs protected characteristic. (Minute Order, 2/1/24.) Plaintiff has not addressed this defect. Accordingly, Carrs demurrer to the Second Cause of Action is SUSTAINED. Because Plaintiff has not alleged any new facts to cure this defect after being given leave to amend once before, leave to amend is DENIED. Given the courts ruling, the court need not and does not address Carrs argument that the second cause of action is time-barred. 2. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (12th Cause of Action) The elements of an intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) cause of action are: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant; (2) intention to cause or reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress; (3) severe emotional suffering; and (4) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress. (See Moncada v. West Coast Quartz Corp. (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 768, 780.) To satisfy the element of extreme and outrageous conduct, defendants conduct must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized society. (Id.) A personnel management decision does not constitute extreme and outrageous conduct even if it were improperly motivated by discrimination and retaliation. (See Janken v. GM Hughes Electronics (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 55, 79-80; see also Light v. California Department of Parks and Recreation (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 75, 101-102.) Like the FAC, Plaintiff bases his IIED claim on Fredericks alleged conduct in 2014 and 2018, Carr and Mohlers alleged conduct the last of which occurred in 2020, and Plaintiffs termination in 2021. The court sustained Individual Defendants demurrer to the IIED claim in the FAC because it was based on conduct that occurred beyond the applicable statute of limitations. A cause of action for IIED must be brought within 2 years. (Code Civ Proc., § 335.1.) Here, Plaintiff filed this action more than two years later (on September 15, 2023). The SAC does not allege any new facts. Nonetheless, Plaintiff attempts to avoid the same result by arguing that Plaintiffs termination on September 21, 2021 is sufficient to sustain his IIED claim under a continuing violations theory. Generally, the continuing violations doctrine may expand the limitations period for an IIED claim where the outrageous conduct is an ongoing pattern of harassment or discrimination. (Murray v. Oceanside Unified Sch. Dist. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1338, 1363.) However, as the court noted in its February 1, 2024, order, Plaintiffs termination is the only event that falls within the two-year limitations period. The court further noted that the Individual Defendants, as employees of the [Disney] Defendants, cannot be held liable for terminating Plaintiffs employment. (Minute Order, 2/01/24.) Plaintiff does not meet this argument. The IIED claim against Individual Defendants remains defective. Accordingly, Individual Defendants demurrer to the twelfth cause of action is SUSTAINED. Because Plaintiff has not alleged any new facts to cure this defect, leave to amend is DENIED. 3. Conclusion Frederick and Carrs demurrer to the second cause of action is Sustained. Individual Defendants demurrer to the twelfth cause of action is Sustained. Leave to amend is Denied. B. Disney Defendants Demurrer Disney Defendants demur to the fourth, fifth, seventh, eighth, tenth, and twelfth causes of action in the SAC. The court addresses each cause of action in turn. 1. Failure to Provide Reasonable Accommodation (4th Cause of Action) The Fourth Cause of Action is based on Disney Defendants failure to provide Plaintiff with his requested accommodation not to work with Carr because working with Carr exacerbated Plaintiffs anxiety and depression. There are three elements to a failure to accommodate action: (1) the plaintiff has a disability covered by the FEHA; (2) the plaintiff is a qualified individual (i.e., he or she can perform the essential functions of the position); and (3) the employer failed to reasonably accommodate the plaintiffs disability.¿ (CACI No. 2541; Hernandez v. Rancho Santiago Cmty. College Dist. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1187, 1193-1194.) [A]n employer's persistent failure to reasonably accommodate a disability . . . is a continuing violation if the employer's unlawful actions are (1) sufficiently similar in kindrecognizing, & , that similar kinds of unlawful employer conduct, such as acts of harassment or failures to reasonably accommodate disability, may take a number of different forms (see Fielder v. UAL Corp., supra, 218 F.3d at pp. 987-988); (2) have occurred with reasonable frequency; (3) and have not acquired a degree of permanence. (Berry [v. Board of Supervisors of L.S.U. (1983) 715 F.2d 971], 981.) But consistent with our case law and with the statutory objectives of the FEHA, we further hold that permanence in the context of an ongoing process of accommodation of disability, or ongoing disability harassment, should properly be understood to mean the following: that an employer's statements and actions make clear to a reasonable employee that any further efforts at informal conciliation to obtain reasonable accommodation or end harassment will be futile. (Richards, 26 Cal.4th at p. 823.) In sustaining the Disney Defendants demurrer to the FAC, the court agreed with Disney Defendants that the fourth cause of action was time-barred, and further, that the continuing violation doctrine did not apply. In so finding, this court observed that Plaintiff should have reasonably understood that litigation was his only alternative to vindicate his rights. And, Plaintiff resorted to litigation when he filed a charge with DFEH in 2016 for a request for accommodation which was first made in 2014. Plaintiff asserted the same violation. Plaintiff does not allege any new facts in the SAC to support this cause of action. As before, Disney Defendants argue this claim is time-barred and Plaintiff contends that the continuing violation doctrine applies. Plaintiff now attempts to avoid demurrer by again advancing the same argument: that the failure to accommodate had not reached a level of permanence until Plaintiffs termination. In support, Plaintiff cites Acuna v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2012) 217 Cal.App.4th 1402 (Acuna) and Blue Fountain Pools & Spas Inc. v. Superior Court (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 239 (Blue Fountain). Neither case changes the result. In Acuna, Acuna filed a 2007 DFEH complaint alleging that her employer was refusing to accommodate her disability. The trial court ruled, and the Court of Appeal agreed, that [b]y retaining counsel and filing a DFEH complaint, Acuna manifested an understanding that further attempts at informal, rather than formal, resolution of the disability accommodation process would not be successful and were futile. Under these circ*mstances, the continuing violations doctrine is inapplicable. Because Acuna did not file her lawsuit within one year of receiving the [2007] right-to-sue notice, her disability discrimination claim is time-barred. (Acuna, 217 Cal.App.4th at pp. 14141415.) Here, Plaintiff tries to distinguish this case from Acuna by stating he did not retain counsel, and Disney Defendants failure to accommodate Plaintiff did not reach a level of permanence. The court disagrees. Plaintiff focuses on the wrong event in Acuna. The event which triggered the statute of limitations in Acuna was receiving the right-to-sue notice in 2007, not retaining counsel. Moreover, like Acuna, Plaintiff filed a DFEH complaint and thus manifested an understanding that further attempts at informal, rather than formal, resolution & would not be successful and were futile. (Acuna, at p. 1415.) So too here. Blue Fountain is also distinguishable. There, the Court of Appeal denied a writ of mandate following the denial of a motion for summary adjudication on the issue of permanence under the FEHA. Blue Fountain involved the question whether it is reasonable for an employee to think that renewing a complaint to new management would not be futile. (Blue Fountain, supra, 53 Cal.App.5th at p. 252.) That is not this case. Plaintiff does not allege similar facts. Plaintiff alleges the same violation from 2014 to 2021: Disney Defendants failure to accommodate the request not to work with Carr. Plaintiff filed a charge with DFEH in 2016 and received a right-to-sue letter. At this point, Plaintiff manifested his understanding that informal attempts to resolution were futile. Plaintiff did not timely file this lawsuit. This claim is time-barred.[3] Disney Defendants demurrer to the fourth cause of action is SUSTAINED. Leave to amend is DENIED. 2. Failure to Engage in Good Faith Interactive Process (5th Cause of Action) The fifth cause of action is based on Disney Defendants purported failure to engage in a good faith interactive process with Plaintiff concerning his request not to work with Carr. FEHA requires employers to engage in a good faith interactive process to determine effective reasonable accommodations, if any, in response to a request for reasonable accommodation by an employee . . . with a known physical or mental disability . . . .¿ (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (n); Raine v. City of Burbank (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1215, 1222.)¿ To establish a claim for failure to engage in the interactive process, a plaintiff must show: (1) defendant was an employer; (2) plaintiff was defendants employee; (3) plaintiff was disabled; (4) plaintiff requested reasonable accommodation; (5) plaintiff was willing to participate in a timely good faith interactive process with plaintiff to determine whether a reasonable accommodation could be made; (6) defendant failed to participate in this process; (7) plaintiff was harmed; and (8) defendants failure to engage in a good-faith interactive process was a substantial factor in causing plaintiffs harm.¿ (CACI No. 2546.)¿¿¿ Disney Defendants argue this claim is time-barred. In sustaining Disney Defendants demurrer to the FAC, the court stated: Like the fourth cause of action, Disney Defendants argue that the fifth cause of action is time-barred because Plaintiff filed his first charge with the DFEH in 2016. (See RJN 1.) Therefore, Plaintiff was on notice at least as of 2016 that further efforts to end the unlawful conduct would be in vain. The court agrees. Plaintiffs cause of action accrued in 2016. He was on notice he needed to litigate his claim. (Richards, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 823.) As alleged, Disney Defendants failure to engage in a good faith interactive process regarding Plaintiffs request not to work with Carr is a repetition of the same claim. Plaintiff does not allege any new violation occurring in the applicable period that would support this cause of action. The reasoning applies here -- again. Disney Defendants demurrer to the fifth cause of action is SUSTAINED. Leave to amend is DENIED. 3. Breach of Oral Contract and Breach of Implied-in-Fact Contract (7th and 8th Causes of Action) [T]he vital elements of a cause of action based on a contract are mutual assent (usually accomplished through the medium of an offer and acceptance) and consideration. As to the basic elements, there is no difference between an express and an implied[-in-fact] contract.¿ (Pacific Bay Recovery Inc. v. California Physicians Services, Inc. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 200, 215.)¿ To prevail on a cause of action for breach of contract, the plaintiff must prove (1) the contract, (2) the plaintiff's performance of the contract or excuse for nonperformance, (3) the defendant's breach, and (4) the resulting damage to the plaintiff.¿ (Richman v. Hartley (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1182, 1186.)¿ While an express contract is defined as one, the terms of which are stated in words (Civil Code, § 1620), an implied [in fact] contract is an agreement, the existence and terms of which are manifested by conduct (Civ. Code, § 1621)&[B]oth types of contract are identical in that they require a meeting of minds or an agreement [citation]. Thus, it is evident that both the express contract and contract implied in fact are founded upon an ascertained agreement or, in other words, are consensual in nature, the substantial difference being in the mode of proof by which they are established [citation]. [Citation.]¿ (Pacific Bay Recovery, supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at pp. 215-16.)¿ The court sustained Disney Defendants demurrer to the seventh and eighth causes of action because the FAC did not allege the terms, conditions, and circ*mstances of the contract not to terminate Plaintiff without good cause. (Minute Order, 3/29/24.) In the SAC, Plaintiff asserts one new allegation in support of his breach of contract claims: When Berberian was first interviewed and hired at Disney, he was told, Welcome to the Disney family and that many people spent their entire careers at Disney and retire from Disney. Thus, throughout his over 20-years of employment, Berberian saw this to be true, as he himself was able to work for Defendants for decades and witnessed several long-term employees remain employed for decades and eventually retire. As such, it was clear that the culture and practice of Disney was to keep employees long-term and Berberian was hopeful that he could continue working and, eventually, retire from Disney. SAC, ¶¶ 15(a), 69, 74.) Plaintiff also alleges, as before, that he received positive reviews during his employment, and he performed his job in an exemplary manner. (SAC, ¶ 12.) These allegations are still insufficient to support a breach of an express oral contract claim. For a breach of an express oral contract, a plaintiff must allege explicit words by which the parties agreed that he would not be terminated without good cause. (Zilmer v. Carnation Co. (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 29, 34-36, overruled on other grounds by Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1238.) The SAC does not allege the explicit words to which the parties agreed. The court reaches the same conclusion as to the eighth cause of action for breach of implied-in-fact contract. In California, employment is presumed to be at-will if there is no express agreement specifying the length of employment or grounds for termination. (Lab. Code § 2922; Foley v. Interactive Data Corp. (1988) 47 Cal.3d 654, 677.) An employee can rebut that presumption by establishing the existence of an express contract, or by showing that the parties conduct created an implied-in-fact contract restricting the employers ability to terminate him. (Foley at p. 677.) However, an employees mere passage of time in the employers service, even where marked with tangible indicia that the employer approves the employees work, cannot alone form an implied-in-fact contract that the employee is no longer at will. (Guz v. Bechtel Natl, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 341-42.) Here, Plaintiff alleges only that he was employed by Disney Defendants for a time and that he was given positive performance reviews. Under Guz, this is insufficient to establish the existence of an express contract. Accordingly, Disney Defendants demurrer to the Seventh and Eighth Causes of Action is SUSTAINED. Leave to amend is DENIED. 4. Whistleblower Retaliation (10th Cause of Action) Labor Code section 1102.5, subdivision (b) provides, [a]n employer, or any person acting on behalf of the employer, shall not retaliate against an employee for disclosing information, or because the employer believes that the employee disclosed or may disclose information, to a government or law enforcement agency, to a person with authority over the employee or another employee who has the authority to investigate, discover, or correct the violation or noncompliance, or for providing information to, or testifying before, any public body conducting an investigation, hearing, or inquiry, if the employee has reasonable cause to believe that the information discloses a violation of state or federal statute, or a violation of or noncompliance with a local, state, or federal rule or regulation, regardless of whether disclosing the information is part of the employee's job duties.¿ (Lab. Code, § 1102.5, subd. (b).)¿ To establish a claim for whistleblower retaliation, the following elements must be met: (1) plaintiff engaged in a protected activity; (2) plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal link exists between the protected activity and adverse actions. (Mokler v. Cty. of Orange (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 121, 138.) The tenth cause of action is based on Plaintiffs complaints about Carrs and Mohlers conduct and his continual request for reasonable accommodation. (See SAC, ¶¶ 15(c), (e), (g), (j), (k).) Further, Plaintiff was subjected to adverse employment actions when he was denied accommodations, written up by Frederick, and subsequently furloughed then terminated. (SAC, ¶¶ 15(i)-(l).) The court previously sustained Disney Defendants demurrer to this cause of action on two grounds: (1) it was time-barred; and (2) the allegations did not establish a causal link between the protected activities and adverse employment actions. Plaintiff does not allege any new facts in the SAC to support his retaliation claim. The court again finds Plaintiffs retaliation claim is insufficiently pleaded. A look at each basis for his retaliation claim proves the point. First, Plaintiff conflates a failure to accommodate with an adverse employment action. (See Brown v. Los Angeles Unified School District (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 1092, 1106-1107 [we note the FEHA scheme prohibits specific unlawful employment practices by covered employers, e.g., discrimination, retaliation, failure to make reasonable accommodation, failure to engage in the interactive process with the employee. We conclude that the commission of one specific prohibited employment practice does not, in and of itself, constitute commission of all other prohibited employment practices under the broad rubric of policies or practices affecting the terms, conditions or privileges of employment. Such an interpretation would be contrary to the whole point of specifically separating conduct into individual unlawful employment practices. Brown has not alleged she was the target of disparate treatment. Nor has she alleged a policy or practice that had a disproportionate effect on employees suffering from a disability. She simply alleged that LAUSD failed to engage meaningfully with her in the interactive process and would not reasonably accommodate her disability. Those allegations pertain to her remaining causes of action, but we decline to construe them, without more, as adverse employment actions sufficient to support a claim of discrimination in the terms and conditions of employment. We agree with the trial court that Brown has conflated adverse employment action with the failure to accommodate and failure to engage claims.].) Second, Frederick attempted to write-up Plaintiff for reporting Carrs conduct in 2018. That event, having occurred (up to) four years prior the filing of his Complaint with this court, is time-barred. Third, Plaintiffs furlough (in 2020) and eventual termination (in 2021) are still untethered to the alleged protected activity (in 2018 and 2019). Accordingly, Disney Defendants demurrer to the tenth cause of action is SUSTAINED. Leave to amend is DENIED. 5. IIED (12th Cause of Action) The elements of an intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) cause of action are: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant; (2) intention to cause or reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress; (3) severe emotional suffering; and (4) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress. (See Moncada, supra, 221 Cal.App.4th at p. 780.)¿¿ A cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress accrues, and the statute of limitations begins to run, once the plaintiff suffers severe emotional distress as a result of outrageous conduct on the part of the defendant. (Cantu v. Resol. Tr. Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App. 4th 857, 889.) ¿ The IIED claim is based upon Individual Defendants alleged conduct and Disney Defendants allegedly wrongful termination of Plaintiffs employment. As noted before, the SAC does not allege any new facts in support of the IIED claim. The court has sustained Individual Defendants demurrer to the IIED cause of action because it is time-barred. (See Discussion, supra, section (C)(2).) The court further noted that the only alleged conduct falling within the statute of limitations was Plaintiffs termination. However, terminating an employee is not alone sufficient to satisfy the standard for extreme and outrageous conduct. (Pitman v. City of Oakland, 197 Cal.App.3d 1037, 1047.) Accordingly, Disney Defendants demurrer to the twelfth cause of action is likewise SUSTAINED. Leave to amend is DENIED. 6. Conclusion Disney Defendants demurrer is Sustained. Leave to amend is Denied. V. DISPOSITIONS Individual Defendants demurrer is Sustained. Disney Defendants demurrer is Sustained. Leave to amend is Denied. Plaintiff is directed to file a Third Amended Complaint for the sole purpose of removing the objected-to causes of action within 20 days of this order. Disney Defendants are to file and serve their Answer to the Third Amended Complaint within 20 days of service of the amended pleading. Defendants to give notice. Dated: February 1, 2024 Kerry Bensinger Judge of the Superior Court [1] As the best the court can tell from the SAC, Fredericks attempt to enforce a write-up against Plaintiff means Frederick attempted to formally reprimand Plaintiff for accusing Carr of stealing. However, the write-up process was not completed for unknown reasons. [2] Citing Roby v. McKesson Corp. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 686, Plaintiff asserts that Fredericks attempt to write Plaintiff up for reporting Carrs suspicious behavior may be actionable as harassment because it had the effect of communicating a hostile message. Plaintiff misreads Roby. In Roby, an employee (Roby) sued her employer and her supervisor (Schoener) for harassment and related claims. (Roby, 47 Cal.4th at p. 697.) Roby generally alleged that she suffered from panic attacks and was terminated for reasons having to do with her disability. (Ibid.) The evidence at trial disclosed that Schoener made negative comments in front of other workers about Roby's body odor, although Schoener knew from Roby that medication was causing the odor. (Id. at p. 695.) Moreover, Schoener openly ostracized Roby in the office, refusing to respond to Roby's greetings and turning away when Roby tried to ask questions, and Schoener made a facial expression of disapproval when Roby took rest breaks because of her panic attacks. (Ibid.) The jury returned a verdict on Robys claims, including her harassment claim. The Court of Appeal overturned the harassment verdict on the ground that the evidence was insufficient. Relying on Reno v. Baird (1998)18 Cal.4th 640, 645-46 (Reno) and Janken v. GM Hughes Electronics (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 55 (Janken), the Court of Appeal reasoned that a plaintiff could not use personnel management actions as evidence to support a harassment claim. (Id. at pp. 700-701.) The Supreme Court reversed. Explaining that harassment focuses on situations in which the social environment of the workplace becomes intolerable because the harassment (whether verbal, physical, or visual) communicates an offensive message to the harassed employee, the Court found that Schoener's actions could not fairly be characterized as an official employment action. None involved Schoener's exercising the authority that [the employer] had delegated to her .... Rather, these were events that were unrelated to Schoener's managerial role, engaged in for her own purposes. (Id. at pp. 706, 709, emphasis in original.) In other words, Roby affirmed the principle first stated previously in Reno that the exercise of personnel management authority properly delegated by an employer to a supervisory employee might result in discrimination, but not in harassment. (Id. at p. 706, citing Reno, supra, at p. 646, emphasis in original.) Unlike the supervisor in Roby, Fredericks action attempting to write up Plaintiff -- was an employment action. Further, Plaintiff does not allege that Frederick directly harassed Plaintiff, or acted outside of her delegated authority for her own purpose. Roby is inapposite. [3] Plaintiff advances the argument that Plaintiffs 2016 DFEH charge does not reference claims for failure to provide a reasonable accommodation or failure to engage in the interactive process. He merely checked off disability as a protected category and stated claims for discrimination and retaliation. As such, Plaintiff argues his second DFEH charge in 2022 set forth his fourth and fifth causes of action for the first time. The argument lacks merit. The Court of Appeal rejected a similar argument in Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243. In Nazir, Nazir checked the boxes for race, color, age, religion, disability, and national origin and ancestry in response to a question DFEH pre-complaint questionnaire asking: I believed I was discriminated against because of my (please circle). (Id. at p. 264.) There was no box for harassment. When Nazir filed a lawsuit, he asserted a harassment claim against the defendant. (Id. at p. 250.) Finding that the plaintiff had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, the trial court granted summary adjudication on the plaintiffs harassment claim. (Id. at p. 264.) The Court of Appeal reversed. It held that [t]he administrative exhaustion requirement is satisfied if the allegations of the civil action are within the scope of the EEOC charge, any EEOC investigation actually completed, or any investigation that might reasonably have been expected to grow out of the charge. Thus, the judicial complaint may encompass any discrimination like and reasonably related to the allegations of the EEOC charge. (Id. at pp. 266-67.) Applying the reason in Nazir here, the DFEH charge does not contain a box for failure to accommodate or failure to engage in interactive process. However, Plaintiff selected disability as his protected category. Failure to accommodate and failure to engage fall within the scope of his disability discrimination claims.

Ruling

Lucia Miranda vs. Ralph-Pugh CO., INC., A California Corporation

Aug 27, 2024 |CU23-05899

CU23-05899Defendant’s Demurrer and Motion to StrikeTENTATIVE RULINGDefendant RALPHS-PUGH CO., INC. demurs to the first amended complaint (“1AC”) ofPlaintiff LUCIA MIRANDA alleging causes of action for (1) disability discrimination inviolation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (the “FEHA”), (2) failure toaccommodate disability, (3) failure to engage in the interactive process, (4) retaliation,(5) failure to prevent harassment, (6) interference with California Family Rights Act(“CFRA”) leave, (7) retaliation in violation of the FEHA, and (8) wrongful termination.Summarized, the 1AC alleges that Plaintiff was Defendant’s employee, suffered a kneeinjury on the job, took leave, and was terminated from her employment due to having adisability and/or taking leave.Defendant also moves to strike the 1AC’s allegations of punitive damages. Page 1 of 6Legal Standard on Demurrer. “The function of a demurrer is to test the sufficiency ofthe complaint as a matter of law.” (Holiday Matinee, Inc. v. Rambus, Inc. (2004) 118Cal.App.4th 1413, 1420.) A complaint must allege facts sufficient to establish everyelement of each cause of action. (Rakestraw v. California Physicians’ Service (2000)81 Cal.App.4th 39, 43.) A complaint is sufficient if it alleges ultimate rather thanevidentiary facts, but the plaintiff must set forth the essential facts of his or her case“with reasonable precision and with particularity sufficient to acquaint [the] defendantwith the nature, source and extent” of the plaintiff’s claim. (Doheny Park TerraceHomeowners Assn., Inc. v. Truck Ins. Exchange (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1099.)Legal conclusions are insufficient. (Id. at 1098–1099; Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007)42 Cal.4th 531, 551, fn. 5 [ultimate facts sufficient].) The Court “assume[s] the truth ofthe allegations in the complaint, but do[es] not assume the truth of contentions,deductions, or conclusions of law.” (California Logistics, Inc. v. State of California(2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 242, 247.)Service of Administrative Complaint. Exhaustion of administrative remedies is aprerequisite for civil actions under the FEHA. (Grant v. Comp USA, Inc. (2003) 109Cal.App.4th 637, 645.) Government Code section 12962, subdivision (b) provides thata plaintiff with retained private counsel must have that counsel serve the plaintiff’sverified administrative complaint on the defendant at the time of initial contact or withinsixty days, whichever happens first. However, this is not a jurisdictional prerequisiteand failure to comply will not bar a civil action under the FEHA. (Wasti v. Superior Court(2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 667, 673.)Workers’ Compensation Exclusivity. As a general rule, an employee who suffers anindustrial injury arising out of and in the course of employment is limited to recoveryunder the workers’ compensation system. (Torres v. Parkhouse Tire Service, Inc.(2001) 26 Cal.4th 995, 1001.) Workers’ compensation exclusivity is not material on thisdemurrer because Plaintiff does not seek remedies for her knee injury. She seeksremedies for alleged adverse employment action due to disability and protectedactivities.FEHA Discrimination. A cause of action for discrimination under Government Codesection 12940, part of the FEHA, requires that a plaintiff allege (1) that he is a memberof one of the various protected categories, (2) that he could perform the essentialfunctions of his job, and (3) he was subjected to an adverse employment actionbecause of his membership in a protected category. (Wills v. Superior Court (2011) 195Cal.App.4th 143, 159-160.) A person is “physically disabled” within the meaning of theFEHA if, among other things, he has a physiological condition that both affects aspecific bodily system (here significantly including the neurological or musculoskeletalsystems) and limits a major life activity, with “limits” meaning that the condition makesthe achievement of the major life activity difficult. (Gov. Code, § 12926, subd. (m)(1).)A plaintiff presenting a disability-related cause of action under the FEHA mustdemonstrate that his condition constitutes a disability according to the statutorydefinition; it is insufficient to simply allege a disability or identify an injury or physical Page 2 of 6condition. (Gelfo v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 34, 47 (Gelfo).)Though repeated or extended absences from work for medical appointments mayconstitute a limitation on the major life activity of working, merely stating that a personwas unable to work for a period of time, or even that the person was hospitalized, is notenough to state a FEHA disability. (Ross v. County of Riverside (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th580, 594 [periodic time off for out-of-state testing is limitation]; Avila v. ContinentalAirlines, Inc. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1237, 1249 [employer unaware of disability fromforms stating inability to work for four days and hospitalization for three days but notstating any condition].)Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient. She states she had a disability from her injuredleft knee. (1AC at ¶ 8.) Plaintiff offers nothing about how her injury impaired any majorlife activity. Further, the 1AC appears to allege full recovery. Plaintiff alleges she wasoff work for a short while and then returned to her regular position after spending sometime in a different position. (1AC at ¶¶ 8-10.) There is no allegation of a legallyrecognizable disability.Reasonable Accommodation. Plaintiff’s cause of action for failure to provide areasonable accommodation under Government Code section 12940, subdivision (m),part of the Fair Employment and Housing Act or the “FEHA,” requires that she plead (1)she had a disability covered by the FEHA, (2) she was able to perform the essentialfunctions of her position, and (3) her employer failed to reasonably accommodate herdisability. (Jensen v. Wells Fargo Bank (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 245, 256.)As Plaintiff does not allege a qualifying disability, Plaintiff does not allege failure toaccommodate. She does not allege any failure to reasonably accommodate her either.She in fact alleges that Defendant gave her a special accommodating position upon herreturn to work, which she accepted and held before returning to her regular position.(1AC at ¶¶ 9-10.)Failure to Engage in Interactive Process. Plaintiff’s lack of identified disability alsodefeats her cause of action for failure to engage in the interactive process. Relatedly,Plaintiff fails to plead that Plaintiff initiated the interactive process with Defendant or thatPlaintiff’s disability and resulting limitations were so obvious that there was no need forher to do so. “Where the disability, resulting limitations, and necessary reasonableaccommodations, are not open, obvious, and apparent to the employer,…the initialburden rests primarily upon the employee…to specifically identify the disability andresulting limitations, and to suggest the reasonable accommodations.” (Scotch v. ArtInstitute of California (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 986, 1013.) “Although it is the employee’sburden to initiate the process, no magic words are necessary, and the obligation arisesonce the employer becomes aware of the need to consider an accommodation.” (Gelfo,supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at p. 62, fn. 22.) Plaintiff’s allegations of an injured knee thatapparently healed do not plead limitations of and necessary accommodations for adisability so open, obvious, and apparent to Defendant as to oblige it to accommodate.Nor does Plaintiff plead that she initiated an interactive process with Defendant in whichDefendant then refused to participate in good faith. Page 3 of 6Interference with CFRA Leave. The CFRA is a part of the FEHA that offers protectionto employees needing family or medical leave. (Gibbs v. American Airlines, Inc. (1999)74 Cal.App.4th 1, 6.) It entitles employees to take up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave ina twelve-month period to care for their own serious health condition or for otherpersonal or family medical situations. (Nelson v. United Technologies (1999) 74Cal.App.4th 597, 606.) Plaintiff alleges that she requested a “short, finite” leave fromwork after her knee injury and Defendant gave her that. (1AC at ¶ 8.) Nowhere doesshe allege facts showing that Defendant interfered with her CFRA right to leave.FEHA Retaliation. To prove retaliation under the FEHA a plaintiff must prove (1) heengaged in a protected activity, (2) the employer subjected him to an adverseemployment activity, and (3) there was a causal link between the two events. (Nealy v.City of Santa Monica (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 359, 380.) Protected activity takes theform of opposing any practice forbidden by the FEHA or participating in any proceedingconducted by the Department of Fair Employment and Housing or the Fair Employmentand Housing Council. (Ibid.) Temporal proximity may demonstrate a causalrelationship depending on the degree of proximity and the likelihood of a cause-and-effect relationship. (Overhill Farms, Inc. v. Lopez (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1248, 1267 [ininterference with prospective economic advantage context unprecedented audit fromclient within two weeks of labor protest permits inference of causation].)Plaintiff alleges that she took CFRA leave, which counts as a protected activity given itis an entitlement under the FEHA. (1AC at ¶ 8.) Plaintiff alleges an adverseemployment activity in the termination of her employment. (Id. at ¶ 11.) However,Plaintiff’s allegations do not state a sufficiently proximate temporal connection betweenevents. She began leave at an unspecified time shortly after her February 24, 2023injury. (Id. at ¶ 8.) She returned to work in a different position at an unspecified time inApril 2023. (Id. at ¶ 10.) She returned in her regular position at an unspecified time in“early” May 2023. (Ibid.) It could have been as long as six weeks between her takingleave and Defendant terminating her employment. Where Plaintiff lacks otherallegations increasing the likelihood of a cause-and-effect relationship this degree oftemporal proximity is insufficient to withstand demurrer.Failure to Prevent Discrimination; Wrongful Termination. These remaining causesof action are derivative of the foregoing and cannot succeed where those fail. Withoutdiscrimination there can be no failure to prevent discrimination and without wrongfulconduct there can be no wrongful termination.Motion to Strike. Code of Civil Procedure section 436, subdivision (a) permits a courtto strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading, upon amotion or in its discretion. Irrelevant matters are those not essential to the statement ofa claim or defense or not pertinent to or supported by an otherwise sufficient claim ordefense and demands for relief not supported by the allegations. (Code Civ. Proc. §431.10.) “The grounds for a motion to strike shall appear on the face of the challengedpleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice;” Page 4 of 6therefore, a motion to strike may not be based upon extrinsic evidence such as adeclaration. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437, subd. (a).)As the 1AC does not sufficiently state any cause of action, Defendant’s motion to strikeis moot.Leave to Amend. Leave to amend is proper where identified defects are amenable tocure. (Vaccaro v. Kaiman (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 761, 768.) The court finds that thoughthis is Plaintiff’s first amended complaint the identified defects could be cured throughamendment.Conclusion. Defendant’s demurrer is sustained with leave to amend. Defendant’smotion to strike is denied as moot.

Ruling

Rivera, III vs. Sierra Pacific Industries, Inc.

Aug 27, 2024 |23CV-0203610

RIVERA, III VS. SIERRA PACIFIC INDUSTRIES, INC.Case Number: 23CV-0203610This matter is on calendar for review regarding status of arbitration. Neither party filed a status statementinforming the Court of the status of arbitration. An appearance is necessary on today’s calendar. Note JudgeBaker, who is handling this morning’s Dept. 63 matters, is recused in this case. If agreeable with counsel,information about the status of arbitration will only be collected for the purpose of Judge Hanna makingwhatever further orders, if any, he deems appropriate. Alternatively, if counsel agree to a continued date,the Court can accept an agreement to do so.

Ruling

Wayne Captain, Jr. vs. Rubicon Enterprises, Inc.

Aug 22, 2024 |C22-00791

C22-00791CASE NAME: WAYNE CAPTAIN, JR. VS. RUBICON ENTERPRISES, INC. HEARING IN RE: FINAL APPROVAL HEARINGFILED BY:*TENTATIVE RULING:*Plaintiff Wayne Captain Jr. moves for preliminary approval of his class action and PAGA settlementwith defendants Rubicon Enterprises and Rubicon Programs. He also moves for approval of hisattorney’s fees, litigation costs, administration costs, and representative payments.Since preliminary approval was granted, the administrator has mailed notices to 288 class members.20 packets were returned by the post office. Follow up resulted in new addresses, leaving 8 non-deliverable. No objections have been received, and only one class member has opted out.The motion is granted. A. Background and Settlement TermsThe pleadings and papers do not identify defendants’ business but it appears to be an organizationproviding training and employment opportunities for disadvantaged people. Plaintiff worked forRubicon during the relevant period, though his dates and job capacity are not identified.The original complaint was filed on April 8, 2022 as a class action, and thereafter amended to includea PAGA claim.The settlement will create a gross settlement fund of $235,000. The class representative payment tothe plaintiff will be $5,000. Attorney’s fees will be $78,333 (one-third of the settlement). Litigationcosts are $12,124, significantly lower than the prior estimate. The settlement administrator’s costsare estimated at $8,500. PAGA penalties will be $25,000, resulting in a payment of $18,750 to the SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, CONTRA COSTA COUNTY MARTINEZ, CA DEPARTMENT 12 JUDICIAL OFFICER: CHARLES S TREAT HEARING DATE: 08/22/2024LWDA. The net amount paid directly to the class members will be about $106,042, not including PAGApenalties. The fund is non-reversionary. There are 287 participating class members. Based on theclass size, the average net payment for each class member is approximately $369 (somewhat lowerthan previously estimated because the class size is larger than previously thought). The individualpayments will vary considerably, however, because of the allocation formula prorating paymentsaccording to the number of weeks worked during the relevant time. The number of aggrievedemployees for PAGA purposes is smaller, because the starting date of the relevant period is later. Theaverage PAGA distribution will be about $24.The entire settlement amount will be deposited with the settlement administrator within 30 daysafter the effective date of the settlement.The proposed settlement will certify a class of all current and former non-exempt employed atDefendants’ California facilities between April 8, 2018 and September 25, 2023. For PAGA purposes,the period covered by the settlement is June 13, 2021 to September 25, 2023.The class members will not be required to file a claim. Class members may object or opt out of thesettlement. (Aggrieved employees cannot opt out of the PAGA portion of the settlement.) Funds willbe apportioned to class members based on the number of workweeks worked during the class period.A list of class members will be provided to the settlement administrator within 21 days afterpreliminary approval. Various prescribed follow-up steps will be taken with respect to mail that isreturned as undeliverable. Settlement checks not cashed within 180 days will be cancelled, and thefunds will be directed to California Rural Legal Assistance as a cy pres beneficiary.The settlement contains release language covering all claims and causes of action, alleged or whichcould have reasonably been alleged based on the allegations in the operative pleading, including anumber of specified claims. Under recent appellate authority, the limitation to those claims with the“same factual predicate” as those alleged in the complaint is critical. (Amaro v. Anaheim ArenaMgmt., LLC (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 521, 537 (“A court cannot release claims that are outside the scopeof the allegations of the complaint.”) “Put another way, a release of claims that goes beyond thescope of the allegations in the operative complaint’ is impermissible.” (Id., quoting Marshall v.Northrop Grumman Corp. (C.D. Cal.2020) 469 F.Supp.3d 942, 949.)Formal discovery was undertaken, resulting in the production of substantial documents. The mattersettled after arms-length negotiations, which included a session with an experienced mediator.Counsel also has provided an analysis of the case, and how the settlement compares to the potentialvalue of the case, after allowing for various risks and contingencies. For example, much of plaintiff’sallegations centers on possible off-the-clock work, including missed or skipped meal breaks and restbreaks. Defendant, however, pointed out that its formal policies prohibit off-the-clock work, andasserted that it would have had no knowledge of employees beginning work before punching in orcontinuing after punching out. Further, it argued that it was required to make meal and rest breaksavailable, but not required to ensure that they be taken, so long as no employer policy prevented ordiscouraged taking such breaks. As to unreimbursed employee expenses (such as cell phone use,mileage, and masks), plaintiff would have been called on to show that such expenses were in fact SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, CONTRA COSTA COUNTY MARTINEZ, CA DEPARTMENT 12 JUDICIAL OFFICER: CHARLES S TREAT HEARING DATE: 08/22/2024incurred, were reasonably necessary to job performance, and were unreimbursed. Furthermore, thefact-intensive character of such claims would have presented a serious obstacle to class certification.The potential liability needs to be adjusted for various evidence and risk-based contingencies,including problems of proof. PAGA penalties are difficult to evaluate for a number of reasons: theyderive from other violations, they include “stacking” of violations, the law may only allow applicationof the “initial violation” penalty amount, and the total amount may be reduced in the discretion ofthe court. (See Labor Code § 2699(e)(2) (PAGA penalties may be reduced where “based on the factsand circ*mstances of the particular case, to do otherwise would result in an award that is unjustarbitrary and oppressive, or confiscatory.”)) Moreover, recent decisions may make it difficult forPAGA plaintiffs to recover statutory penalties, as opposed to actual missed wages. (See, e.g., Naranjov. Spectrum Security Services, Inc. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 937; but see Gola v. University of SanFrancisco (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 548, 566-67.)Counsel attest that notice of the proposed settlement was transmitted to the LWDA concurrentlywith the filing of the motion. B. Legal StandardsThe primary determination to be made is whether the proposed settlement is “fair, reasonable, andadequate,” under Dunk v. Ford Motor Co. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1801, including “the strength ofplaintiffs’ case, the risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of further litigation, the risk ofmaintaining class action status through trial, the amount offered in settlement, the extent ofdiscovery completed and the state of the proceedings, the experience and views of counsel, thepresence of a governmental participant, and the reaction … to the proposed settlement.” (See alsoAmaro v. Anaheim Arena Mgmt., LLC, 69 Cal.App.5th 521.)Because this matter also proposes to settle PAGA claims, the Court also must consider the criteriathat apply under that statute. The Court of Appeal’s decision in Moniz v. Adecco USA, Inc. (2021) 72Cal.App.5th 56, provided guidance on this issue. In Moniz, the court found that the “fair, reasonable,and adequate” standard applicable to class actions applies to PAGA settlements. (Id., at 64.) The courtalso held that the trial court must assess “the fairness of the settlement’s allocation of civil penaltiesbetween the affected aggrieved employees.” (Id., at 64-65.)California law provides some general guidance concerning judicial approval of any settlement. First,public policy generally favors settlement. (Neary v. Regents of University of California (1992) 3 Cal.4th273.) Nonetheless, the court should not approve an agreement contrary to law or public policy.(Bechtel Corp. v. Superior Court (1973) 33 Cal.App.3d 405, 412; Timney v. Lin (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th1121, 1127.) Moreover, “the court cannot surrender its duty to see that the judgment to be entered isa just one, nor is the court to act as a mere puppet in the matter.” (California State Auto. Assn. Inter-Ins. Bureau v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 658, 664.) As a result, courts have specifically notedthat Neary does not always apply, because “where the rights of the public are implicated, theadditional safeguard of judicial review, though more cumbersome to the settlement process, serves a SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, CONTRA COSTA COUNTY MARTINEZ, CA DEPARTMENT 12 JUDICIAL OFFICER: CHARLES S TREAT HEARING DATE: 08/22/2024salutatory purpose.” (Consumer Advocacy Group, Inc. v. Kintetsu Enterprises of America (2006) 141Cal.App.4th 48, 63.) C. Attorney Fees and Other CostsPlaintiff seeks one-third of the total settlement amount as fees, relying on the “common fund”theory, or $78,333. Even a proper common fund-based fee award, however, should be reviewedthrough a lodestar cross-check. In Lafitte v. Robert Half International (2016) 1 Cal.5th 480, 503, theSupreme Court endorsed the use of a lodestar cross-check as a way to determine whether thepercentage allocated is reasonable. It stated: “If the multiplier calculated by means of a lodestarcross-check is extraordinarily high or low, the trial court should consider whether the percentageused should be adjusted so as to bring the imputed multiplier within a justifiable range, but the courtis not necessarily required to make such an adjustment.” (Id., at 505.)Accordingly, plaintiffs have provided information concerning the lodestar fee amount. They estimatethe lodestar at $102,777, representing an implied multiplier of about 0.76. No adjustment from theone-third fee is necessary. The attorney’s fees are reasonable and are approved.The requested representative payment of $5,000 for the named plaintiff was deferred until this finalapproval motion. Criteria for evaluation of such requests are discussed in Clark v. AmericanResidential Services LLC (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 785, 804-07. Plaintiff has provided a declaration insupport of the request. Plaintiff points out that he executed a broader release than the class as awhole, but does not identify any particular claims of value that he may have. He also risks damage tohis reputation and more difficulty in obtaining employment. The representative payments areapproved.Litigation costs of $12,124 (mostly mediation, filing, and consultant fees) are reasonable and areapproved.The settlement administrator’s costs of $8,500 are reasonable and are approved. D. Discussion and ConclusionThe moving papers sufficiently establish that the proposed settlement is fair, reasonable, andadequate to justify final approval. The allocation of PAGA penalties among the aggrieved employees(based on pay periods) is reasonable.The motion is granted.Counsel are directed to prepare an order reflecting this entire tentative ruling and the other findingsin the previously submitted proposed order and a separate judgment.The ultimate judgment must provide for a compliance hearing after the settlement has beencompletely implemented, to be determined in consultation with the Department’s clerk by phone.Plaintiffs’ counsel are to submit a compliance statement one week before the compliance hearing SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, CONTRA COSTA COUNTY MARTINEZ, CA DEPARTMENT 12 JUDICIAL OFFICER: CHARLES S TREAT HEARING DATE: 08/22/2024date. Five percent of the attorney’s fees are to be withheld by the claims administrator pendingsatisfactory compliance as found by the Court. Counsel are reminded that once all payments arecompleted, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 384(b), the judgment must be amended to reflectthe amount paid to the cy pres recipient.

Ruling

McCullough vs. Wright Tree Services, Inc, et al.

Aug 29, 2024 |23CV-0203309

MCCULLOUGH VS. WRIGHT TREE SERVICES, INC, ET AL.Case Number: 23CV-0203309This matter is on calendar for review regarding status of removal and settlement. The parties havesubmitted a Joint Status Report indicating this matter has settled and the parties are working towardfinalizing the agreement and seeking preliminary approval from the Eastern District. This matteris continued Monday, November 25, 2024, at 9:00 a.m. in Department 64 for review regardingstatus of removal and settlement. No appearance is necessary on today’s calendar.

Ruling

WILSON, CYNTHIA vs SUTTER HEALTH

Aug 29, 2024 |CV-24-003489

CV-24-003489 – WILSON, CYNTHIA vs SUTTER HEALTH – Defendant, HSS Security, LLC’s Motion to Compel Arbitration, Dismiss Non-Individual Claims, and Stay Action – CONTINUED, on the Court’s own motion.The Court finds the supporting declaration and exhibits attached to the declaration of Damira Bradaric relevant to the determination of issues herein.The general rule is that new evidence is not permitted with reply papers and is only allowed in exceptional cases (Jay v. Mahaffey (2013) 218 Cal. 4th 1522, 1537-1538). However, the Court has discretion to accept new evidence in reply papers as long as the opposing party is given an opportunity to respond (Alliant Ins. Services, Inc. v. Gaddy (2008) 159 Cal.4th 1292, 1307-1308).The Court hereby exercises its discretion to accept Damira Bradaric’s declaration and exhibits into evidence. Plaintiff shall respond to same within seven (7) days of the date of this ruling. Said response shall not exceed five (5) pages in length.Accordingly, this matter is CONTINUED to October 15, 2024, at 8:30 a.m. in Department 24.The Case Management Conference on September 9, 2024, is vacated and rescheduled to January 27, 2025, at 8:30 a.m. in Department 24.

Ruling

ORFELINA SIERRA VS WHOLE FOODS MARKET, INC.,

Aug 28, 2024 |23VECV03853

Case Number: 23VECV03853 Hearing Date: August 28, 2024 Dept: W ORFELINA SIERRA vs WHOLE FOODS MARKET, INC., et AL. DEFENDANT Mrs. goochs natrual food markets, inc.s motoin to strike punitive damages Date of Hearing: August 28, 2024 Trial Date: None set. Department: W Case No.: 23VECV03853 Moving Party: Defendant Mrs. Goochs Natural Food Markets, Inc. Responding Party: No opposition Meet and Confer: Yes. (Zare Decl. ¶¶2-4.) BACKGROUND On September 5, 2023, Plaintiff Orfelina Sierra filed a complaint against Whole Foods market, Inc. for 1. Promissory Fraud - [Deceit]; 2. Promissory Fraud [Negligent Misrepresentation]; 3. Breach of Oral Contract; 4. Unpaid Wages, Lab. Code 210, 203, 218.5; 5. Sexual Harassment Govt. Code 12940; 6. Discrimination on the Bases of Age, Race, National Origin, and/or Color in Violation of FEHA; 7. Failure to Take Reasonable Steps to Necessary to Prevent Workplace Discrimination In Violation of FEHA; 8. Wrongful Termination; 9. Unfair Business Practices B&P Code 17200; 10. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress: 11. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress; 12. Wrongful Constructive Termination and Retaliation in Violation of Public Policy Tameny; and 13. Defamation. On October 30, 2023, Plaintiff named Mrs. Goochs Natural Food Markets, Inc. as Defendant Doe 1. On November 2, 2023, Plaintiff dismissed Whole Foods Market, Inc. from the complaint. [Tentative] Ruling Defendant Mrs. Goochs Natural Food Markets, Inc.s Motion to Strike is GRANTED. discussion Defendant Mrs. Goochs Natural Food Markets, Inc. moves the court for an order striking Plaintiff Orfelina Sierras claim for punitive damages on the grounds the allegations were improperly made part of the complaint. The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (CCP § 436(a).) The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (CCP § 436(b).) The grounds for a motion to strike are that the pleading has irrelevant, false or improper matter, or has not been drawn or filed in conformity with laws. (CCP § 436.) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (CCP § 437.) California Civil Code section 3294 authorizes the recovery of punitive damages in non-contract cases where the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice . . . . (Civ. Code § 3294(a).) Malice means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. (Id. § 3294(c)(1).) Oppression means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that persons rights. (Civ. Code § 3294(c)(2).) Fraud means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to defendant with the intention on the part of defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury. (Civ. Code § 3294(c)(3).) An employer shall not be liable for [punitive] damages ..., based upon acts of an employee of the employer, unless the employer had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others or authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct.... With respect to a corporate employer, the advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, [or] ratification ... must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation. (Civil Code § 3294.) The California Supreme Court interpreted the latter statement as requiring the officer, director, or managing agent to be someone who exercise[s] substantial discretionary authority over decisions that ultimately determine corporate policy. (White v. Ultramar, Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 563, 577.) Defendant argues Plaintiffs request for punitive damages is entirely devoid of the required specific facts articulating oppression, fraud or malice by any sufficiently senior person employed by Defendant, which is required to state a claim for punitive damages against a corporate entity defendant. Defendant contends all Plaintiff has done is to repeatedly allege boilerplate legal conclusions and rhetoric related to punitive damages i.e., Defendants actions were fraudulent, malicious and oppressive but does not allege how they were fraudulent, malicious or oppressive. Moreover, even if Plaintiff could establish oppression, fraud, or malice in her pleadings, Plaintiffs complaint is devoid of any allegations that there was advance knowledge or conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud, or malice on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of Defendant. The court agrees. Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to support a claim for punitive damages against Defendant. The complaint is devoid of allegations that Defendant intended to cause Plaintiffs harm in a malicious way, or that Defendant acted despicably and in conscious disregard for the probable dangerous consequences of its conduct. At most, the allegations amount to negligence. Moreover, there are no supporting allegations that any of the conduct was authorized or ratified by Defendant. The motion is unopposed. Accordingly, the motion to strike is GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. If plaintiff intends to seek punitive damages at some later point in time, plaintiff must bring a motion for leave to amend..

Ruling

MIRIAM A. VS GLENDALE ADVENTIST MEDICAL CENTER, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, ET AL.

Aug 30, 2024 |23GDCV01806

Case Number: 23GDCV01806 Hearing Date: August 30, 2024 Dept: D TENTATIVE RULING Calendar: 5 Date: 8/30/2024 Case No: 23 GDCV01806 Trial Date: January 26, 2026 Case Name: Miriam A. v. Glendale Adventist Medical Center, et al. MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO DOCUMENT DEMANDS Moving Party: Defendant Glendale Adventist Medical Center dba Adventist Health Glendale Responding Party: Plaintiff Miriam A. RELIEF REQUESTED: Further Response to Requests for Production of Documents, Set One, Nos. 19, 28, 30, 33 and 34. FACTUAL BACKGROUND: Plaintiff Miriam A. alleges that plaintiff was hired as a registered nurse by defendants Glendale Adventist Medical Center and Adventist Health System/West on July 7, 2023, and was set to start her first day of work on August 21, 2023. In July of 2023, prior to plaintiffs first day at work, plaintiff made requests to defendants for religious accommodations, as plaintiff is Jewish and observes the Jewish Sabbath as part of plaintiffs religious practice. Specifically, plaintiff requested not to work on the Jewish Sabbath and Jewish holidays, which plaintiff alleges are accommodations easily made by nearly every hospital in California. The complaint alleges that on August 9, 2023, plaintiff was told by defendants HR that we have not found a work around to meet the department needs that will also accommodate your religious exemption request. Plaintiff alleges that defendants made no good faith efforts to accommodate plaintiffs request and effectively rescinded their offer of employment to plaintiff due to plaintiffs religion and request for religious accommodation. The complaint alleges causes of action for religious discrimination and retaliation for request for religious accommodation. The file shows that on January 25, 2024, plaintiff filed a request for dismissal without prejudice of the action as to defendant Adventist Health System/West only, which dismissal was entered as requested the same date. ANALYSIS: Procedural Separate Statement incomplete CRC Rule 3.1345 requires that, Any motion involving the content of a discovery request or the responses to such a request must be accompanied by a separate statement. Under the Rule: The motions that require a separate statement include a motion:& (3) To compel further responses to a demand for inspection of documents or tangible things;& CRC Rule 3.1345(c) provides that a separate statement is a separate document filed and served with the discovery motion that provides all the information necessary to understand each discovery request and all the responses to it that are at issue. This separate statement must include for each discovery request to which a further response is requested, (1) The text of the request, interrogatory, question or inspection demand in addition to (2) The text of each response, answer or objection, and any further responses or answers, ... (emphasis added). The subdivision further states that The separate statement must be full and complete so that no person is required to review any other document in order to determine the full request and the full response. Here, the declaration in support of the motion indicates that plaintiff served Responses to the Requests for Production, then served Amended Responses, on March 12, 2024, then served Second Amended Responses on April 19, 2024, and then served Third Amended Responses on May 15, 2024. [Mercurio Decl., paras. 3, 7, 13, 17, Exs. B, F, H and J]. The separate statement includes a Response to each Request, and for Request No. 19, an Amended Response, but does not include any Amended Responses for the other Requests, to which the exhibit shows Amended Responses were served. [See Ex. F]. The separate statement does not include the Second Amended Responses at all, when the exhibit shows that a Second Amended Response was served to all Requests which are the subject of this motion. [See Ex. H]. There is no mention of the Third Amended Response when the exhibit shows there was a Third Amended Response served to Request No. 19. This situation makes the motion confusing for the court and has required the court to consult other documents to make sense of the motion. In People ex rel. Harris v. Sarpas (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1539, the court of appeal held: The trial court denied the second motions to compel because Defendants had not shown a reasonable and good faith attempt at meeting and conferring and because the motions failed to comply with the applicable rules regarding separate statements. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's rulings. People, at 1554 In Mills v. U.S. Bank (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 871, the court of appeal considered a challenge to a trial courts order denying a motion to compel discovery, which the trial court had denied on both substantive and procedural grounds. The court of appeal held, we conclude that the procedural basis cited by the trial court was a sufficient basis for the exercise of discretion to deny the motion to compel. Mills, at 892. The court of appeal accordingly did not discuss the substantive ground addressed by the trial court. Mills, at 892, n. 23. In Mills, a separate statement had been submitted, but did not set forth the full responses to each of the discovery requests at issue, instead grouping together several requests, stating responses in relevant part and truncating some responses. The court of appeal also noted that the statement provided statements of reasons for compelling further responses which were confusing because it was not indicated which request or requests the reasons related to. Mills, at 893. The court of appeal rejected an argument that the full responses had been available to the court as the responses were attached to the motion, holding that the rule expressly forbids this practice by requiring the statement to be full and complete, and expressly not permitting material to be incorporated into the separate statement by reference. Mills, at 893, citing former Rule 335 and current Rule 3.1020(c). The court of appeal considered former Rule 335, which has not been significantly modified in these respects in the current rule, and concluded: We conclude that because Plaintiffs did not comply with the requirements of former rule 335, the trial court was well within its discretion to deny the motion to compel discovery on that basis. (Cf. Neary v. Regents of University of California (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 1136, 1145 [230 Cal. Rptr. 281] [describing trial court's denial of motions to compel discovery because of a nonconforming separate statement].) Mills, at 893. Here, the separate statement is similarly defective. The court would be within its discretion to deny the motion on this ground alone but elects not to do so. Meet and Confer The opposition argues that this motion was filed improperly after plaintiff sent defendant a meet and confer letter on June 6, 2024, offering to work out a compromise, but instead of responding to the letter, counsel filed the motion on June 7, 2024, including with the motion a declaration which falsely denies receiving the June 6, 2024 letter. The Mercurio Declaration submitted with the moving papers, dated June 7, 2024 states that counsel for defendant sent several emails, and states, When I did not hear back, I emailed Plaintiffs counsel on June 4, 2024 to inquire into Requests Nos. 19, 28, 30, 33, and 34. I did not receive a response. [Mercurio Decl., para. 19]. The June 6, 2024 email is not attached to the moving papers or in any way referenced. The opposition argues that counsel for defendant has refused to correct this misrepresentation, made under oath. The opposition argues that counsel does not deny that the declaration included a misrepresentation when it was signed, but that counsel believes the signing of the false statement was justified because the motion had already been completed on June 6, 2024 and was ready to be filed. The opposition includes a copy of an email from counsel for plaintiff to counsel for defendant dated June 10, 2024, in which counsel for plaintiff states: your motion to compel and declaration are purposeful misstatements to the court. We responded to your concerns on June 6, 2024 and proposed a compromise on several issues. You did not respond to our compromise (you failed to meet and confer); you just filed a motion to compel and signed declaration on June 7, 2024 (the day after we responded) claiming that we never responded to your email meet and confer. That was a terrible misrepresentation, and we intend to bring this up with the court. [Levy Decl., Ex. 2, bold in original]. Later that same date, counsel for plaintiff responded to defendant stating that counsel for defendant waited to respond to meet and confer efforts until almost 4 pm on June 6, the day before the motion to compel deadline, yet did not suggest extending the motion to compel deadline, and that given that the motion was already completed by the time you sent your below email, AHGL has filed its Motion to Compel. [Levy Decl., Ex. 3]. This representation effectively concedes that the June 6 email had been received, but the motion and the declaration stating plaintiff had never responded were filed with those misstatement anyway. The reply also concedes that the email was received, but argues it was sent well after AHGL had already finalized its moving papers. [Reply, p. 1:8-10]. The declaration dated June 7, 2024 stating that no response to meet and confer had been received by that date is accordingly false. The court does not condone such conduct on the part of an officer of the court. Under CCP § 2031.310, permitting a party to move to compel a further response to document demands, such a motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040. CCP section 2031.310(b)(2). Section 2016.040 requires: A meet and confer declaration in support of a motion shall state facts showing a reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented by the motion. As discussed below, the June 6, 2023 meet and confer letter by plaintiff offered some compromises with respect to the current discovery dispute, which could have avoided at least portions of this motion to be brought before the court, and it appears that counsel deliberately misled the court concerning the status of the dispute. The reasonableness and good faith of the meet and confer efforts is accordingly subject to question. However, the court is not inclined to disregard the motion on this ground, but only out of concern for the interest of judicial efficiency. These circ*mstances will be addressed in connection with the requests for monetary sanctions. Substantive Under CCP § 2017.010, any party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action..., if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. The section specifically provides that [d]iscovery may relate to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or of any other party to the action, and that discovery may be obtained of the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter, as well as of the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any document, electronically stored information, tangible thing, or land or other property. CCP § 2031.310 provides that a party demanding a document inspection may move for an order compelling further responses to the demand if the demanding party deems that: (1) A statement of compliance with the demand is incomplete. (2) A representation of inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive. (3) An objection in the response is without merit or too general. Under CCP § 2031.310 (b)(1), The motion shall set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the inspection demand. The burden is on the moving party to show both relevance to the subject matter and specific facts justifying discovery. Glenfed Develop. Corp. v. Superior Court (1997, 2nd Dist.) 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117. Once good cause is established by the moving party, the burden then shifts to the responding party to justify any objections made to document disclosure. See Hartbrodt v. Burke (1996, 2nd Dist.) 42 Cal.App.4th 168, 172-174. Request No. 19 This request seeks: All DOCUMENTS, including but not limited to telephone bills or telephone records, that reflect any telephone calls made by any AHGL employee to YOU from July 14, 2023 to the present regarding YOUR pending employment with AHGL or YOUR request for a religious accommodation. The amended response is a series of objections, including overbroad, burdensome, that the documents are equally available to defendant, that the request seeks premature disclosure of expert opinion, privacy, and that the request is vague, compound and calls for a legal conclusion. Plaintiff further objects to the extent the request calls for information protected by the attorney-client privilege, or work product privilege. The response then states: Plaintiff objects that Defendant has not provided Plaintiff with a list of phone numbers used by its employees to communicate with Plaintiff. Notwithstanding, subject to, and without waiving these objections, Plaintiff responds as follows: Plaintiff has produced all responsive, non-objectionable, non-privileged documents in her possession, custody, or control. See ANDRUSIER 100-110. Discovery and investigation continue. Defendant argues that the request seeks discoverable information bearing directly on plaintiffs claims, in effect that defendant made no good faith efforts to accommodate plaintiffs religious observance, as the telephone records would reflect the number of times defendants representatives attempted to or contacted plaintiff regarding her requests and pending employment. Defendant points out that, in fact, plaintiff does not object to the request as seeking irrelevant material. Defendant also argues that although plaintiff represents that she has produced all responsive documents, it appears that plaintiff has not produced all responsive documents, as in response to a separate request, plaintiff produced documents showing that a senior HR advisor at defendant called plaintiff twice on September 11, 2024 [sic] to discuss a proposed accommodation, but the production to Request No. 19 redacts all phone calls for the month of September 2023. Defendant argues that the records should be produced unredacted. Defendant also argues that any privacy concerns are not implicated as an expectation of privacy only extends to the content of the conversations not to records that indicate that the conversation occurred, which is what is requested here. Defendant cites to United States v. Lustig (9th Cir. 1977) 555 F.2d 737, in which the Ninth Circuit noted in a footnote, in a criminal case, in reliance on federal law: [Defendant] also claims that the use of his telephone records as evidence violated his right to privacy. It is well established that the expectation of privacy only extends to the content of telephone conversations, not to records that conversations took place. United States v. Baxter, 492 F.2d 150, 167 (9 Cir. 1973). See also United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 96 S.Ct. 1619, 48 L.Ed.2d 71 (1976) (subpoena to bank custodian for checking accounts does not violate rights of defendant). Lustig, at 747, n.10. This showing is sufficient to shift the burden to plaintiff to justify objections. Plaintiff in opposition argues that plaintiff in fact produced phone records, with redactions to conceal the non-relevant calls, and with no redactions of calls from defendants personnel. Plaintiff argues that defendant wrongly indicates that plaintiff improperly redacted calls made on September 11, 2023, but plaintiff has proved that these accusations are false. Plaintiffs counsel explains that counsel prepared the document production of the phone records by making a list of 24 possibly relevant phone numbers, including the phone number ending with the digits 8363 mentioned in the moving papers, and that counsel had to create the list of numbers because defendants counsel refused to identify the phone numbers defendant thought were relevant. [Levy Decl., paras. 6-8]. Counsel for plaintiff indicates that counsel did not redact any call to or from the 8363 phone number. [Levy Decl., para. 8]. The declaration also indicates that had defense counsel told plaintiffs counsel they suspected calls to or from the 8363 phone number had been redacted, plaintiffs counsel could have confirmed that this was not the case. [Levy Decl., para. 9]. The declaration attaches a document which counsel indicates is a copy of the phone records with the calls from September 11, 2023 unredacted. [Levy Decl., para. 5, Ex. 4]. Plaintiffs counsel states that those phone records show that Plaintiff did not make or receive any calls from the number specified by Defendant in the moving papers (ending with the digits 8363) at any time on September 11, 2023. [Levy Decl., para. 5]. The unredacted document submitted as Exhibit 4 appears to show all incoming and outgoing calls from that date, and no calls to or from the specified number are listed. [Ex. K]. As confirmed in the reply, the request does not seek information regarding calls to and from irrelevant third parties but is expressly limited to calls made by any AHGL employee to YOU&regarding YOUR pending employment with AHGL or YOUR request for a religious accommodation. It would appear that a reasonable first step here would be having counsel for defendant identify the phone numbers defendant believes could lead to discovery of discoverable materials, particularly as defendant is in a better position to identify those numbers. It would appear that plaintiffs counsel has in good faith searched all of the documents produced in this case by plaintiff and by defendant to generate a list of 24 telephone numbers, which included the number on which defendant now relies. [Levy Decl., paras. 7, 8]. It is clear that the numbers which were on plaintiffs counsels list should be disclosed, and defendant can then make any additions to that list. Counsel for plaintiff is ordered to redact the records according to those lists, and serve a code compliant response, as the current response does not in fact comply with the code. Under CCP section 2031.210, a response shall either be a statement of compliance, a representation that the party lacks the ability to comply, or an objection. With respect to a statement of compliance, CCP section 2031.220 requires: A statement that a party to whom an inspection demand has been directed will comply with the particular demand shall state that the production, inspection, and related activity demanded will be allowed either in whole or in part, and that all documents or things in the demanded category that are in the possession, custody, or control of that party and to which no objection is being make will be included in the production. Plaintiffs further response must comply with this section. To the extent defendant seems to argue that defendant is entitled to all unredacted phone records, as the making and receiving of calls is not considered private information, that argument is based on federal case law under the federal discovery statutes. However, plaintiff points out that California case law recognizes in some measure that courts generally consider residential telephone and address information private& Puerto v. Superior Court (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1252. In Puerto, the Second District addressed a circ*mstance where plaintiffs brought an action against their former employer for alleged wage and hour violations and sought through Form Interrogatory No. 12.1 the contact information of other employees. The employer in that case had identified by name and position between 2,600 and 3,000 employees. The trial court granted a motion to compel a further response to the interrogatory, and ultimately approved a process whereby a third-party administrator sent a letter to each affected individual informing them of the request for their address and phone number in connection with the litigation and permitting the individuals to give their permission, or to opt out. The Second District granted a writ of mandate and held that the trial court had abused its discretion in placing obstacles to plaintiffs obtaining the contact information. The Second District reviewed the standards applicable to the privacy analysis in connection with contact information, balanced the need for the information against the intrusiveness into the privacy of individuals, and concluded that the contact information was discoverable. The Second District set forth the following standard to be applied in privacy analysis cases, as articulated by the California Supreme Court in Pioneer Electronics (USA), Inc. v. Superior Court (2007) 40 Cal.4th 360: First, a claimant must possess a legally protected privacy interest. (Hill, at p. 35.) Second, the claimant must have a reasonable expectation of privacy under the particular circ*mstances, including the customs, practices, and physical settings surrounding particular activities. (Id. at pp. 3637.) Third, the invasion of privacy must be serious in nature, scope, and actual or potential impact. Trivial invasions do not create a cause of action. (Id. at p. 37.) If there is a reasonable expectation of privacy and the invasion of privacy is serious, then the court must balance the privacy interest at stake against other competing or countervailing interests, which include the interest of the requesting party, fairness to the litigants in conducting the litigation, and the consequences of granting or restricting access to the information. (Pioneer, at pp. 370371.) Puerto, at 1250-1251. The Second District in Puerto was dealing with a situation where percipient witness employees had already been identified by defendant. Plaintiff argues here that this is not a situation where defendant seeks contact information for relevant witnesses, but a situation where plaintiff, and the third parties with whom she was in contact by telephone at the time, have a privacy interest in those transactions and phone records. Here the defendant has cited, and plaintiff has been unable to find, any legal authority for the proposition that irrelevant, non-witnesses must be outed. Plaintiff has established a recognized privacy interest in her call records other than those to and from defendant made by defendants employees, and an interest on the part of the third parties reflected in those records, a reasonable expectation of privacy, and a serious invasion if wholesale discovery is permitted. Defendant has not argued that there is a countervailing interest which would be served by disclosure of calls which do not involve defendants entitlement to information that would have a relation to plaintiffs allegation that defendant made no good efforts to accommodate plaintiffs religious observance. Defendant in the reply concedes that the request specifically seeks records of conversations with defendants employees, not conversations with non-witnesses. In balancing the interests here, the court believes that the method of proceeding outlined above best accommodates the parties respective interests. Plaintiff has failed to justify any objections beyond the privacy objection as to numbers not identified with defendant or its agents or employees. The plaintiff is ordered to provide further response without other objections. As a final note, when plaintiff serves further responses, plaintiff should be aware that the court does not view as acceptable a response to discovery which states, Discovery and investigation continue. Defendant is entitled to a full and complete response now, based on plaintiff having complied with her obligation to investigate in response to the discovery request. See CCP section 2031.230, requiring an attestation from the responding party that a diligent search and a reasonable inquiry has been made in an effort to comply with a document demand. Requests Nos. 28 and 33 Request No. 28 seeks: All diaries, records, notes, calendar entries, or memoranda created by YOU from July 14, 2023 to the present, which relate to YOUR pending employment with AHGL or any of the allegations in YOUR COMPLAINT. This Request expressly excludes any records or notes created for or at the direction of YOUR attorney in this matter. Request No. 33 seeks: An unaltered and unedited printout or copy of the current or past contents of any professional and/or social networking pages or accounts that YOU maintain or maintained, that contain information RELATED TO YOUR claims in this action, including but not limited to LinkedIn, Facebook, Instagram, TikTok or Twitter. The responses consist of the same objections set forth above, and do not include substantive responses. The objections again include that the requests are overbroad, burdensome, that the documents are equally available to defendant, that the requests seek premature disclosure of expert opinion, privacy, and that the requests are vague, compound and call for a legal conclusion. Plaintiff further objects to the extent the requests call for information protected by the attorney-client privilege, or work product privilege. Defendant argues that the requests are directly relevant to claims that defendant made no good faith efforts to accommodate plaintiffs request, effectively rescinded its offer of employment, and that plaintiff has suffered severe emotional distress caused by the alleged conduct. The information is relevant and discoverable. This showing is sufficient to shift the burden to plaintiff to justify objections and failure to comply. Plaintiff in opposition argues that the requests are vague, as asking for any records that relate to her employment with defendant or any allegation in the complaint. Plaintiff argues that she alleges matters such as that she resides in Los Angeles, is Jewish and observes the Jewish sabbath, so the requests as written are impossible to understand. Plaintiff also argues that Request No. 28, seeking documents created by YOU, would include notes created by plaintiffs attorney. This assertion is nonsense, as plaintiff can reasonably read the request to apply to documents created by plaintiff, as the request expressly states the Request excludes any records or notes created for or at the direction of YOUR attorney in this matter. Defendant points this out in the reply. Plaintiff primarily argues in connection with these requests that plaintiff in the June 6, 2024 correspondence offered to respond to these requests as narrowed to diaries, records, notes, calendar entries, or memoranda created by plaintiff and the other documents which are discussing or disclosing employment with Defendant or her religious accommodation request, but defendant never responded to that offer, but filed the motion falsely concealing the proposal from the court. It would appear that this narrowing is not really necessary, as the Requests seek the specified documents relating to YOUR pending employment with AHGL or any of the allegations in YOUR COMPLAINT, and documents that that contain information RELATED TO YOUR claims in this action. Under CCP section 2017.010, any party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action...if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. The section specifically provides that discovery may relate to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or of any other party&. Plaintiff has failed to justify this suggested narrowing and is ordered to serve responses to these Requests as propounded. Plaintiff has failed to discuss or justify any of the other objections. Plaintiff accordingly is ordered to serve further responses to these Requests which include all information requested, without objections, and to produce all responsive documents. The further responses must fully comply with the code and provide a code-complaint statement of compliance, as discussed above. Request No. 30 This request seeks: All DOCUMENTS that RELATE TO any medical or psychological treatment YOU have received for emotional distress or any mental condition in the five (5) years prior to July 14, 2023, including but not limited to medical records, billings, appointments, and prescriptions. The response consists of the same objections set forth above, with no substantive response, including objections that the request is overbroad, burdensome, that the documents are equally available to defendant, that the request seeks premature disclosure of expert opinion, privacy, and that the request is vague, compound and calls for a legal conclusion. Plaintiff further objects to the extent the request calls for information protected by the attorney-client privilege, or work product privilege. Defendant argues again that plaintiff has not objected that the request seeks irrelevant or not discoverable materials and establishes that the request bears directly on plaintiffs claim for severe emotional distress. Defendant argues that plaintiff has placed her emotional state at issue by claiming such emotional distress and waived her right to privacy regarding her emotional state by pursuing emotional distress damages in this action. Under Evidence Code § 990 and 1010, a patient enjoys a privilege to refuse to disclose any confidential communication between himself and a treating physician. Section 996 provides an exception where the patient is a litigant, stating that there is no privilege... as to a communication relevant to an issue concerning the condition of the patient if such issue has been tendered by ...[the] patient. Defendant cites to Heller v. Norcal Mutual Ins. Co. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 30, 43, in which the California Supreme Court observed: By placing her physical condition in issue in the [previous medical malpractice] litigation, plaintiff's expectation of privacy regarding that condition was substantially lowered by the very nature of the action. Heller, at 43. Defendant also cites to Britt v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844, in which the California Supreme Court reversed a trial courts order granting a motion to compel discovery of a plaintiff homeowners medical histories in a nuisance and personal injury case against an airport, concluding: While [plaintiffs] may not withhold information which relates to any physical or mental condition which they have put in issue by bringing this lawsuit, they are entitled to retain the confidentiality or all unrelated medical or psychotherapeutic treatment they may have undergone in the past. Britt, at 862. Defendant argues that under Britt, defendant is entitled to discovery not only concerning any current treatment plaintiff is undergoing related to her claimed emotional distress, but also to discovery concerning mental or emotional issues in the past which may have contributed to the emotional distress claimed here. Britt, at 864, n. 9 (It should be understood, of course, that insofar as a number of injuries or illnesses& have contributed to a medical condition placed in issue by a plaintiff, defendant is entitled to obtain information as to all such injuries or illnesses.) Defendant argues that this includes conducting discovery regarding potential outside stressors unrelated to plaintiffs potential employment with defendant. Defendant primarily relies on Vinson v. Superior Court (1987) 43 Cal.3d 833, 842, in which the California Supreme Court considered a case in which a plaintiff had sued her former employer for sexual harassment and alleged that defendants conduct caused her to suffer emotional distress. In response to a motion to compel plaintiff to undergo a medical and mental examination to test the true nature and extent of her injuries, plaintiff argued that such an examination would violate her right to privacy. Vinson, at 838. Defendant relies on the Courts rejection of this argument in which the Court stated: In the case at bar, plaintiff haled defendants into court and accused them of causing her various mental and emotional ailments. Defendants deny her charges. As a result, the existence and extent of her mental injuries is indubitably in dispute. In addition, by asserting a causal link between her mental distress and defendants' conduct, plaintiff implicitly claims it was not caused by a preexisting mental condition, thereby raising the question of alternative sources for the distress. We thus conclude that her mental state is in controversy. Vinson, at 839-840. The Court found that in that case the trial court appropriately had found good cause for an order compelling plaintiff to undergo the requested physical and mental examination, noting that defendants must be allowed to investigate the continued existence and severity of plaintiffs alleged damages. Vinson, at 840-41. Defendant argues that here, like the plaintiff in Vinson, plaintiff has waived her privacy right by claiming that she suffers from severe emotional distress caused by defendants alleged conduct. Plaintiffs treatment for such alleged emotional distress is therefore relevant and discoverable, and she has waived any right of privacy in this information. Defendant also points out that defendant appropriately has narrowed the scope of this request to apply only to treatment for plaintiffs emotional distress or mental condition, and has reasonably limited the request to five years prior to July 14, 2023. Plaintiff in opposition argues that defendant has made an overbroad request for five years of medical records that have anything to do with emotional distress, or any kind of mental issue, no matter how unrelated to wrongful termination. Plaintiff argues that since the information sought is private information, defendant must establish that the information sought is directly relevant to the claims. As noted above in Puerto, generally, in evaluating a discovery dispute which involves a privacy claim the trial court should apply the framework set forth in Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1. First, a claimant must possess a legally protected privacy interest. Hill, at 35. Second, the claimant must have a reasonable expectation of privacy under the particular circ*mstances, including the customs, practices, and physical settings surrounding particular activities. Hill, at 36-37. Third, the invasion of privacy must be serious in nature, scope, and actual or potential impact. Hill, at 37. If there is a reasonable expectation of privacy and the invasion of privacy is serious, then the court must balance the privacy interest at stake against other competing or countervailing interests. Hill, at 37-40. In Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531 the California Supreme Court reiterated that the Hill analysis is to be applied in determining the scope of discovery of private information and emphasized that the burden to establish a privacy interest remains initially with the party asserting such an interest. Williams, at 552. The Court rejected case law, relied upon by plaintiff here, which requires a party seeking discovery of private information to establish a compelling interest, instead placing the initial burden on the party asserting a privacy objection. Williams, at 557. Here, the opposition does not acknowledge this authority, so plaintiff does not directly attempt to establish an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circ*mstances, or a threatened intrusion that is serious. However, even assuming the showing had been made, defendant has shown how the requests serve an important countervailing interest, in exploring the mental state which plaintiff has placed in issue in this lawsuit. In weighing these considerations, the court finds that the need for information which could shed light on the source of any emotional distress plaintiff claims to have suffered due to defendants alleged discriminatory conduct, which plaintiff has herself put in issue in this case, outweighs plaintiffs privacy interests as reasonably limited by the facts of this case. The request is also reasonably limited in subject matter and timeframe. Plaintiffs insistence in the opposition that this discovery be denied in its entirety is not reasonable if plaintiff intends to continue to pursue significant damages, she claims were suffered due to emotional distress. Plaintiff is ordered to serve a further response to this request, without objection, which fully responds to the request, and includes a code-compliant statement of compliance, and to produce all responsive documents. Request No. 34 This request seeks: Any DOCUMENTS, including any cached or archived printouts or electronic or hard copies, of the contents of any professional and/or social networking pages or accounts that YOU maintain or maintained, including but not limited to LinkedIn, Facebook, Instagram, TikTok or Twitter, that contain information that reveals, refers to, or RELATES TO any emotion, feeling, or mental state YOU experienced from five (5) years prior to the date of YOUR response to this Request to the date of YOUR response to this Request. The same boilerplate objections set forth above are asserted. Defendant argues that this request seeks directly relevant evidence to the claims that plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress. Defendant argues that during meet and confer efforts, plaintiffs only objection appeared to be that the request is highly invasive and overbroad. Defendant again argues that plaintiff has placed her mental condition at issue and waived her right to privacy in documents which relate to her claim for emotional distress. The moving papers cite a federal district court decision, Rosales v. Crawford & Co. (2021 US. Dist. Ct. E.D. Cal) 2021 WL 4429468, in which, in applying the federal discovery rules, the district court stated in connection with a request for production of a plaintiffs social media content: Generally, [social networking] content is neither privileged nor protected by any right of privacy. Mailhoit v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 285 F.R.D. 566, 570 (C.D. Cal. 2012). As relevant here, [s]uch information from social media is relevant to claims of emotional distress because social media activity, to an extent, is reflective of an individual's contemporaneous emotions and mental state. Hinostroza v. Denny's Inc., No. 2:17-cv-02561-RFB-NJK, 2018 WL 3212014, at *6 (D. Nev. June 29, 2018). The request, being sufficiently narrowly tailored to seek relevant information, is appropriate and plaintiff is compelled to respond. Rosales, at 5-6 Defendant also cites to People v. Valdez (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1429, a California criminal case, in which the court of appeal found that MySpace postings were admissible in a criminal trial, but not for the truth of any matters stated in them, in that case, that defendant was a member of a gang. Plaintiff again argues that the request is overly broad, pertaining to any emotion, feeling or mental state of any kind that plaintiff experienced for any reason, and argues that defendant has not met its burden to demonstrate that such information would be directly relevant to plaintiffs claims. Again, plaintiff applies the incorrect standard and burden with respect to privacy objections and fails to meet her initial burden to establish a privacy interest which has not been waived. Plaintiff also fails to address or distinguish the legal authorities concerning the discoverability of alternative causes for emotional distress, and the lack of a privacy interest in social media activity. The request is reasonably limited as propounded, covering five years from the date of the response, which would cover the time since the emotional distress was suffered and less than five years of prior social media activity. The court again finds that even if plaintiff had met any initial burden, the balance of interests here favor compelling a full response to the request. Plaintiff has not attempted to justify any of the other objections. The motion as to this request accordingly is granted. Plaintiff will be ordered to serve a further response to this request, without objection, which fully responds to the request, and includes a code-compliant statement of compliance, and to produce all responsive documents. Sanctions This posture leaves the issue of sanctions, which are sought by both sides. CCP § 2031.310 (h) provides that the court shall impose a monetary sanction...against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel further response to a demand, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circ*mstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. Under CCP § 2023.010, misuse of the discovery process includes, (e) Making, without substantial justification, an unmeritorious objection to discovery; and (f) Making an evasive response to discovery. Where there has been misuse of the discovery process, under Section 2023.030(a), the court may impose a monetary sanction ordering that one engaging in the misuse of the discovery process, or any attorney advising that conduct, or both pay the reasonable expenses, including attorneys fees, incurred by anyone as a result of that conduct. The burden is on the party subject to sanctions to show substantial justification or injustice. Mattco Forge, Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co. (1990, 2nd Dist.) 223 Cal.App.3d 1429, 1436. Here, plaintiff has unsuccessfully opposed the motion for the most part, made objections which plaintiff has failed to justify, and made the major portion of the motion necessary, and reasonable sanctions will be awarded in favor of defendant. Plaintiff argues that sanctions are warranted because defendant unsuccessfully has brought this motion, unreasonably seeking all social media, all medical records mentioning emotional distress or mental health, and private telephone records, and that this unreasonable overreach warrants sanctions. The motion is granted in large part, however. Plaintiff has not successfully opposed it, except to the extent production of unredacted telephone records will not be required, which defendant does not appear to have been seriously pursuing. Plaintiff also argues that sanctions are warranted due to defendants concealment of the June 6, 2024 email from the court. Plaintiff cites no statutory authority other than that which permits sanctions for unsuccessfully bringing a motion to compel, CCP § 2031.310 (h), when the motion here is largely granted. Plaintiff does not seek sanctions under the statutory authority concerning failure to meet and confer in good faith. The court is concerned that the June 6 email should have been disclosed, and plaintiff had offered to produce notes and diaries on a narrowed basis, and further meet and confer may have avoided the motion as to one of the five requests. However, given that plaintiff has not sought sanctions under the meet and confer statute, the sanctions requested by plaintiff are denied. However, the court will take into account the reasonableness of the sanctions requested in light of defendants failure to pursue a possible informal resolution of the dispute as to one of the five requests at issue, and adjust the sanctions awarded to defendant accordingly. The sanctions sought are $6,100, which includes 3 hours spent preparing the motion by defendants attorney, Gabrielle Mercurio, at $445 per hour ($1,335), and 10 hours spent by Candice T. Zee, the Shareholder on this matter, at an hourly rate of $550 ($5,500) (this totals $6,835, not the $6,100 sought). It is not clear who this shareholder is, or that the shareholder has charged defendant for any services, so that the charges would be reasonable expenses incurred by defendant as required. See CCP section 2023.030(a). It is not clear what services the shareholder provided in the preparation of the motion, which is based largely on legal arguments. The claim for such expense is not reasonable under the circ*mstances. Hence, the court awards no more than the reasonable sum incurred for the work of attorney Mercurio which is three hours at $445.00 per hour for a total of $1,335.00. RULING: Defendant Glendale Adventist Medical Center dba Adventist Health Glendales Motion for Compel Further Responses is GRANTED. Request No. 19: Motion is GRANTED in part. The Court notes that the Request as propounded is expressly limited to calls made by any AHGL employee to YOU&regarding YOUR pending employment with AHGL or YOUR request for a religious accommodation. Any argument by defendant that it is entitled to all unredacted telephone records reflecting calls other than those made by any AHGL employee is DENIED. However, the Court orders the parties to proceed with respect to identifying the discoverable information as follows: Plaintiff is ordered to produce within five days the list of 24 numbers which plaintiff concluded were associated with defendant and its employees and which plaintiff used in redacting the telephone records produced. Within five days of receipt of that information from plaintiff, defendant is ordered to serve plaintiff with a list of telephone numbers defendant identifies as numbers of employees which defendant believes could lead to the discovery or discoverable materials, in effect, telephone numbers identified as those which would have been used by defendants employees during the relevant time period. Plaintiff is then ordered within ten days of receipt of the list from defendant to serve a further response to the Request and produce all responsive records with the information affiliated with all of the numbers provided unredacted. The further response is to be without objection, other than a privacy objection as to the material redacted. The further response must provide all information requested, and must fully comply with CCP §§ 2031.210 and 2031.220, including a statement that plaintiff will comply with the demand, including a statement that the production, inspection, and related activity demanded will be allowed either in whole or in part, and that all documents or things in the demanded category that are in the possession, custody, or control of plaintiff and to which no objection is being made will be included in the production. Plaintiff is ordered to produce all responsive documents with the further response. The Court does not find acceptable a response to discovery which states, Discovery and investigation continue. Motion as to Requests Nos. 28, 30, 33 and 34 is GRANTED. Plaintiff is ordered to serve further responses to each of the Requests, without objection. The Court has considered plaintiffs objections, and find they lack merit, or have been waived, or plaintiff has failed to justify them, and all objections are OVERRULED. To the extent plaintiff asserts various privacy objections, the Court notes that plaintiff has placed her mental and emotional state into issue in this matter by claiming damages for emotional distress, and that plaintiff in the opposition papers fails to meet any initial burden of establishing the existence of a valid privacy objection which involves issues which have not been placed in issue by plaintiff in this action, and that even if plaintiff had met this initial burden, defendant has established an important competing interest in discovering the basis for plaintiffs claims, and the sources and severity of any claimed emotional distress. The Court has balanced these competing interests, considered the fact that the requests are narrowly tailored in subject matter and timeframe, and finds that the balance favors disclosure of the information. Plaintiffs further responses must provide all responsive information requested in each request, and must fully comply with CCP §§ 2031.210 and 2031.220, including a statement that plaintiff will comply with each particular demand, including a statement that the production, inspection, and related activity demanded will be allowed either in whole or in part, and that all documents or things in the demanded category that are in the possession, custody, or control of plaintiff and to which no objection is being made will be included in the production. Plaintiff is ordered to produce all responsive documents with the further response. Further responses to be served within ten days. Monetary sanctions requested by moving party: Utilizing a lodestar approach, and in view of the totality of the circ*mstances, the Court finds that the total and reasonable amount of attorneys fees and costs incurred for the work performed in connection with the pending motion is $1,335.00 (3.0 hours @ $445/hour) (3 hours requestedattorney) and (10.0 hours @ $550/hourshareholder) [Amount Requested $6,100], which sum is to be awarded in favor of defendant Glendale Adventist Medical Center dba Adventist Health Glendale, and against plaintiff Miriam A., payable within 30 days. CCP §§ 2031.310(h), 2023.010 (e) and (f), and 2023.030(a). Monetary sanctions requested by plaintiff are DENIED. DEPARTMENT D IS CONTINUING TO CONDUCT AND ENCOURAGE AUDIO OR VIDEO APPEARANCES Please make arrangement in advance if you wish to appear via LACourtConnect by visiting www.lacourt.org to schedule a remote appearance. Please note that LACourtConnect offers free audio and video appearances. However, ADVANCE REGISTRATION IS REQUIRED. If no appearance is set up through LACourtConnect, or no appearance is otherwise made, then the Court will assume the parties are submitting on the tentative.

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